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ABSTRACT 
With a two-sided model, this paper reports an empirical research investigating online Peer-to-Peer lending marketplaces, 
PPDai.com in China and Prosper.com in US. We observe that the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies for the agents in 
the online P2P lending marketplaces are mainly related to the network effects between and within the two sides. Agents’ 
inter-group and intra-group network externalities depend on the demand-supply relationships, which is unlike the assumptions of 
negative intra-group network externalities and positive inter-group network externalities in the previous theoretical research of 
electronic commerce. Besides, as assumed in the theoretical model, it demonstrates significant negative price elasticity of 
demand and supply on both platforms. Based on the theoretical model and empirical results, we analyze the two platforms’ 
profit-maximizing pricing strategies, and explain the rationality and deficiency of the strategies. The findings enhance our 
understanding of the two-sided electronic market, which could shed light on how the platforms make price strategies in this kind 
of electronic market. 
 
Keywords:  two-sided market, pricing strategy,  network externalities,  online Peer-to-Peer lending 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
Background 
The development of new technologies for information and communication has brought informational intermediation to the 
forefront of the “new economy” [1]. Different forms of new industries have emerged and been growing rapidly in last two 
decades, and many of these industries have appeared to match the context of “two-sided market”(see summarized examples of 
two-sided market by Evans [2]). In these markets, intermediaries or “platforms” enable interactions among distinct groups of 
agents and attempt to gain the two sides with rational price to each side [3], where each side derives network externalities from 
the participation of members on the other side. Rochet and Tirole[4] strictly define a two-sided market as one in which the 
volume of transactions between end-users depends on the structure and not only on the overall level of the fees charged by the 
platform. 
 
As a main part of “new economy”, electronic commerce has been growing rapidly for twodecades and penetrated almost all 
industries [5], as well as creating new industries such as online auction houses and digital marketplaces [6]. Many online 
marketplaces show characteristics whereby two groups of agents – the buyers and the sellers – come together and interact with 
one another via the enabling marketplace [7]. Bakos[8] describes two functions that are provided by electronic marketplaces: (1) 
matching buyers and sellers; and (2) facilitation of transactions. According to the emerging theory of two-sided markets, a 
significant number of fast developing electronic marketplaces (i.e., eBay, Taobao, Tmall, Amazon and 360Buy) can be 
characterized as two-sided market. During last two decades, many electronic marketplaces continue to flourish, and are 
generating enormous volumes of trades [3]. For example, Tmall, the largest online B2C marketplace in the world, has more than 
400 million members and its maximum daily transaction value is about ¥ 91.22 billion right in 2015; eBay has about 164 million 
active global users and the total value of transactions in 2015 was more than82.0 billion US dollars. However, during this fast 
developing process, most of electronic marketplace providers have been bothered by the profitability problem. In order to attract 
users, many electronic platforms are free for the users, and sometimes even subsidize the consumers in the form of sales 
promotion. Under this situation, some famous commercial websites, such as Commerce One had gone into bankruptcy.  
 
Furthermore, although much of the electronic commercial in its early years focused on online selling (e-commerce), a wider 
variety of e-business initiatives (collectively described as e-business) have emerged in recent years [9], such as online lending, 
online social networks and online media. These new kinds of electronic marketplaces have different business models and pricing 
strategies from the electronic selling. When the diverse nature and magnitude of the possible interactions in the new electronic 
markets present challenges to the industries as well as the scholars [7], more new opportunities are also offered. Despite the 
differences among different types of electronic marketplaces, they usually face the same challenging issues: What kind of 
network externalities users have in the marketplace? what kinds of factors will affect user network externality? how do user 
network externalities affect the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategy? and how to price services for different kinds of 
users to maximize the platform’s profit? It is going to be helpful for us to figure out the difference among the different forms of 
electronic markets through answering these questions for different kinds of marketplaces, which is useful for the development of 
electronic market.  
 
Intend to find some answers of these questions, this study takes a new form of two-sided electronic market, online Peer-to-Peer 
(P2P) lending, to conduct empirical study by using the transactional data of Prosper.com in US and PPDai.com in China. Our 
objectives are: (1) to quantify user network externalities in the marketplaces; (2) to explore what kind of factors would influence 
on the user network externalities; (3) to find the user’s reaction to the platform’s price strategy; and (4) to investigate how 
network effects and prices impact on the platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies. The rest part of this paper is organized 
as follows. In Sect. 2, we review the related literature. The two-sided market model for online P2P lending is built in Sect. 3. Sect. 
4 displays the empirical results and the detailed analysis. Finally, we summarize the study in Sect. 5. 
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Literature review 
Along with the fast development of different types of two-sided markets, there has been a recent surge of interest in two-sided 
market platforms [7], and the related literature is accumulatively proliferated [10]. These research outcomes are applicable to 
various markets, such as bank card, advertising-supported media, dating agencies, software platforms, telecommunication, and 
shopping malls. A considerable research of two-sided market method in electronic commerce has appears in recent years. 
To date, the literature on two-sided electronic market has concentrated on different research questions.Katsamakas[11] builds a 
two-sided model for an operating system platform to compare industry structures based on a proprietary platform (such as 
Windows) with those based on an open source platform (such as Linux), while Hagiu[12] identifies an economic welfare tradeoff 
between two-sided open platforms and two-sided closed platforms connecting consumers and producers. According to the 
standard two-sided market model of Armstrong [13], Economides andTåg[14] discuss the desirability of departing from network 
neutrality to allow residential Internet access providers to initiate a positive fee to the content and applications side of the market, 
besides the price it charges to users/subscribers. Lin et al. [15] model the innovation race among sellers in both finite and infinite 
horizons to examine a platform’s optimal two-sided pricing strategy. Reisinger[16]analyzes two-part tariffs and Liu and 
Serfes[17]focus on the price discrimination.  
 
Moreover, there has been active research on electronic marketplace in the direction of network externalities. Yoo et al. [18], 
BakosandKatsamakas[19], Belleflamme and Toulemonde[20], Li et al.[7] and Li et al. [3] analyze the effects of two types of 
network externalities on the pricing strategies in an independent intermediary electronic marketplace. Yoo et al. [18] consider the 
intra-group network effects and switching costs with regard to the optimal price of a monopolistic B2B marketplace. Close to 
Yoo et al. [18], Li et al. [3] extend the quantity of services and theoretically analyze a monopolistic e-marketplace with the 
introduction of negative intra-group externalities within members of the two groups. BakosandKatsamakas[19] discuss how the 
electronic intermediary to invest in technologies for each side by modelling endogenous network effects. Compare to other 
models, Li et al.[7]explicitly model the possibility of both positive and negative cross-group and within-group network effects, 
and consider the effect of competition between the sellers as well as the competition between platforms on the price they charge 
the buyers.  
 
Although a considerable literature theoretically discusses the network effects and pricing strategies of electronic marketplace, 
several empirical challenges exist when attempting to test the theory of two-sided market. Toestimate the theory, the researcher 
requires meaningful data on both sides of the market, such asprice and quantity observations, as well as exogenous variation that 
will identify parameters of interest thatdrive the equilibrium decisions of platforms[21].As a result of these requirements, 
researchers have turnedto payment systems and media, especially for the newspaper and magazine markets, where advertising 
and circulation information has been made available, such as German[22], Canadian[23],U.S[21]. In the field of payment 
systems,Rysman[24] and Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran[25] estimate the network effects among users.Related empirical studies 
concerned with the two-sided characteristics of electronic market are also mainly focusing on estimating usersnetwork effects. In 
order to validate the network externality assumed in the theory, Kraemer et al.[6] develop a growth empirical model for the 
platform and empirically analyze the network effects on eBay, and Gupta et al.[26]present a model to value the “free” customers 
wherein buyer and seller growth arise from marketing actions and direct and indirect network effects by apply the model to an 
anonymous auction house’s monthly data. Similar to each other, both Kraemer et al.[6] and Gupta et al.[26]only empirically 
analyze network effects in two-sided electronic markets, but do not quantify the interactive effects between price and network 
externality. Chu and Manchanda[27] state that previous work often focused onthe benefits (or costs) a user obtains from 
additional users from either the same orthe opposite user group, but not simultaneously from both sides. In order to solve the 
problem of the requirement of complex data to support the empirical research, Hildebrand[28] develops a semi-structural 
approach to identifying network effects on two-sided monopoly platforms without data on prices and quantities. 
 
Early empirical studies of two-sided market, such as Rysman[24], Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran[25],Kraemer et al.[6] and 
Gupta et al.[26]–mainly emphasize the network effects among users and how important it is to take the view that these markets 
are two-sided markets.Unlike these studies, this researchuses the transaction data of online Peer-to-Peer market, not only 
empirically estimates the network effects among users in two-sided electronic market, but also analyzes the effects of platform’s 
pricing strategies and how network effects and prices impact on the platform’s profit. The research is helpful to understanding the 
characteristics of two-sided electronic market  as well as makes up for the deficiency of the empirical research. 
 
As a new application of IT technology in the financial industry, online P2P lending market matches people who need loans with 
the willing lenders. Without banks as intermediaries, borrowers and lenders in online P2P lending markets could communicate 
and trade with each other directly. The loan without any mortgage may cause inherent risk of defaults. In order to solve the 
problem of information asymmetry, most of the scholars[i.e., 29, 30, 31] focus on human behaviour in the online P2P lending 
market, especially the effects of social network on the loan performance. However, little attention has been paid on the pricing 
strategy of online P2P lending market. As a new form of electronic two-sided market, online P2P lending market has the 
characteristics, such as wide-range consumers, unlimited time and region, and fast information transmission, that an electronic 
market generally has. Besides, it also has some differences from the electronic commerce (online selling) that usually is 
discussed in previous research. The emergence of online P2P lending provides us with a good opportunity to fill the gap of 
insufficient empirical analysis of the electronic market, especially the new form ones. With the daily transaction data of 
Prosper.com in US and PPDai.com in China, we empirically analyzing the users’ network externalities and price sensitivities, as 
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well as the platforms’ pricing strategies, based on the two-sided market theory. From the implications for practice, this study 
enhances our understanding of the electronic markets, which could shed light on how to make pricing strategies for the platforms. 
From the implications for research, the empirical findings of this new form of electronic markets also imply the lack of previous 
literature, and put forward some new research directions. 
 
The two-sided market model for online P2P lending 
Theoretic models of two-sided market 
Based on the business model of online P2P lending, we build a monopoly two-sided market model derived from the one built by 
Armstrong [13]. Consider there are two groups of homogeneous agents in the market, we assume that the utility of a 
representative agent in a group is determined by the inter-group externality, the cost for using the platform and intra-group 
network externality [3, 7]. The two-sided agents’ utility models in online P2P lending marketplace is formalized in equation (1). 
 
                                                    
,i i j i i i i j j i j j j ju n n ir p u n n ir p                                                           (1) 
 
In equation (1), 
in and jn  respectively represent the number of agents in each group; ip and jp  are the prices charged by the 
platform for the two types of agents. Parameter i  ( j ) measures the benefit or loss that a group- i  (group- j ) agent (agent i (j) 
hereafter) undertakes via interacting with agents in group-j (group-i ). Parameter i ( j ) measures the benefit or loss of agent i(j) 
who receives from other agents in the same group. 
 
Suppose the numbers of members in each group who join the platform are the functions of the agents’ utility 
( ), ( , )x x xn u x i j  , the platform’s profit model could be expressed as, 
 
                                                                         
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( )i i i i j j j jp f u p f u                                                                                (2) 
 
where
if  ( jf ) is the per-agent cost that incurs at the platform in group i (j).The platform’s profit function can be rewritten as 
equation (3). 
 
                                           
[ ( ) ( ) ] ( ) [ ( ) ( ) ] ( )
i j j i i i i i i i j i i j j j j j j j
u u u f u u u u f u                                                                (3) 
 
Let i  be the price elasticity of agent i, 
'
i i i ip   , then the platform’s profit-maximizing price ip  should satisfy 
( )
1
i
i j j i i i
i
p f

   

  

. The platform’s profit-maximizing price is determined by the cost of services, inter- and intra- 
group network externalities, and the agent’s price elasticity. Assume the agent’s price elasticity is negative, the relationship of 
agent’s network effect and platform’s costs determines the platform’s pricing strategies. When the agent i ’s network effects 
( j j i i    ) are greater than the variable cost ( if ), the platform should subsidize the agent. However, if the platform’s variable 
cost ( if ) is greater than the agent’s network effects ( j j i i   ), the platform could charge positive fee and take profit from the 
agent. On the other hand, given the value of agent ’s network effects ( j j i i    ), the platform should charge or subsidize 
more (less) when the agent has higher (lower) price elasticity ( i ). The relationships among platform’s profit-maximizing price, 
agent’s network effects, and price elasticity are shown in Fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The relationship among profit-maximizing price, the agent’ network effect and price elasticity 
Online P2P lending market 
i
Price
0
i
ip
p
0j j i i if     
0j j i i if     
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Elasticity
ip
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Online P2P lending market has achieved a great success since Zopa at UK, the earliest online P2P lending marketplace, was 
launched in 2005. Harvard Business Review announced it to be one of the 20 breakthrough ideas for 2009 [32]. Generally 
speaking, there are two kinds of online P2P lending marketplaces, profit marketplace (such as Prosper and PPDai) and non-profit 
marketplace (such as Kiva and Wokai). In this study, online P2P lending market refers to the profit market. In a profit-oriented 
online P2P lending marketplace, the platform helps borrowers and lenders complete the transactions, and charges them fees. In 
general, the business model of online P2P lending is displayed in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Figure2: Business model of online P2P lending 
 
Usually,there are several steps in the transactions process in online P2P lending market. First, borrowers and lenders should 
register on the platform by providing the needed personal information to the platform. Second, if a borrower wants to borrow 
money, she/he could create and publish a loan requested listing. The listing should include the listing information (e.g., amount of 
money needed, the maximum interest rate, loan period, and loan purpose) and borrower’s personal information (e.g., gender, job, 
and income). The third step is bidding process. During the period the listing published in the marketplace, it could be viewed and 
bid by lenders. The listing can be bid by more than one lender. The borrower could obtain the loan if listing is fully funded. After 
the listing is funded, the platform will deposit the funds to the borrower and make sure the listing becomes a loan. In this step, the 
platform charges transaction fees for both borrower and lender. The last step is the repayment of the loan. According to the 
agreement, the borrower repay the principals as well as interests of the loan to the lenders. 
 
The empirical model 
(1) The utility models of two-sided users 
 
In online P2P lending market, a necessary condition for a borrower to obtain loan is that lenders’ total bid amount (Supply) is 
equal to or greater than the borrower’s requested loan amount (Demand) during auction time. When the total bid amount is 
greater than the borrower’s demand amount in a listing, the bidders with lower bidding interest rate finally fund the loan. 
Borrowers’ demand usually could not be satisfied because of the insufficient supply amount, and lenders could not always lend 
money to the borrowers because of the failed listings or failed bid with higher bidding interest rate than other lenders. Then, in the 
marketplace, the total transaction amount is usually smaller than total supply amount and total demand amount. For each period 
t, we could have borrowers’ total demand amount (
t
DAMT ), lenders’ total supply amount (
t
SAMT ), and the total transaction amount 
(
t
TAMT ). 
 
Suppose the borrower could have positive utility in the transaction if and only if the requested listing could be successfully 
funded, while the lender could gain the income in the transaction if and only if the bid amount could be successfully lend to 
borrowers. So, under the certain conditions during a period in the marketplace, the successful rate of borrowers’ demand and the 
successful rate of lenders’ supply could reflect the utilities gained by borrowers and lenders as a whole. The successful rate of 
borrowers’ demand in period t is represented by 
t
SD , which is equal to 
t t
TAMT DAMT . The successful rate of lenders’ demand in 
period t is represented by 
t
SS , which is equal to t tTAMT SAMT .  
 
In the marketplace, whether a borrower could fund the loan or not is determined by the lenders’ supply and the competition with 
other borrowers. For a lender, whether he/she could lend money or not is determined by borrowers’demand and the participation 
of other lenders.Following the assumptions in the theoretical analysis of two-sided market, user’s utility is directly influenced by 
the number of two-sided users as well as the platform’s transaction fees. The total number of lenders and lenders are added into 
the empirical models to capture inter- and intra- group network effects, which are respectively represented by tTB and tTL . 
However, borrowers of different successful transactions usually have different transaction fees because of different loan amounts, 
credit grades and/or loan periods, and lenders have different transaction with each others because of different credit grades, 
interest rates and/or bid amount. In this research, we use average transaction fee rates to indicate the level of transaction fee in 
each period, which are shown as average borrower transaction fee rate tPb and average lender transaction fee rate tPl  in the 
empirical model. Besides, in online P2P lending market, the interest could also directly affect the utilities gained by borrowers 
and lenders, respectively. And we add the average interest rate of the listings, which is denoted as tIR  in the empirical models. 
Furthermore, we consider the control for the effects of total demand amount tDAMT . We get the following empirical 
specifications, 
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1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
,t t t t t t
t t t t t t
LnSD LnTL LnTB LnAVBfrate LnAVIR LnDAMT
LnSS LnTB LnTL LnAVLfrate LnAVIR LnDAMT
     
     
     

     
                                     (4) 
 
where the subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the two groups of agents, and t is date. 
tSD and tSS  are the success rates of demand and 
supply on dayt. 
itPb  ( itPl ) represents the average transaction fee rate of borrowers ( lenders), and 1  ( 2 ) means the borrower’s 
(lender’s) price elasticity. Besides,  ,  are the coefficients of total numbers of two-group agents, which are used to measure the 
inter-group network externality and intra-group network externality;   and   are the coefficients of average interest rate and 
total demand amount on day t ; 1 and 2 are the random error terms of two equations. 
 
(2) Platform’s profit function 
 
In two-sided marketplace, platform’s profit is usually affected by the platform’s price strategies, size of users, and network 
effects among users[i.e., 3, 13, 33]. About the relationships between platform’s profit and the users’ fee rates, the assumption of 
profit-maximizing price indicates the quadratic linear relationship。 So, we build the platform’s profit function is shown as 
equation . 
 
     
2 2
3 3 3 31 32 31 32 3 3t i t i t t t t t tUp c TB TL AVBfrate AVBfrate AVLfrate AVLfrate AVIR                              (5) 
 
Empirical analysis 
Dataset 
The archival data are collected from two major online P2P lending marketplaces, PPDai.com and Prosper.com. PPDai is a 
leading online P2P lending marketplace in China, found in August 2007. It provided over 50 million RMB in loan facilitation for 
over 600,000 registered users since it had been launched.Prosper was founded in February 2006 in US, which is one of the largest 
and earliest online P2P lending marketplace in the world. Right now, it has more than 1.6 million members and over $500 
millions in funded loans. 
 
The daily transaction data of PPDai from 18th June 2007 to 15th June 2011 used in this study was provided by the company 
directly, while the daily transaction data of Prosper from 16th August 2006 to the present is downloadable from Prosper’s website. 
Prosper was shut down by Securities and Exchange Commission during 2008 and 2009 twice because of the legal problem, and 
it re-opened on 13th July 2009 till now. Fig. 3 gives the Prosper’s daily total loan amount from 16th August 2006 to 7th March 
2011 with discontinuities between year 2008 to 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3:Prosper’s daily total loan amount during 2006-08-16 to 2011-03-07 
 
From the Prosper’s daily total transaction amount, we can see that the platform’s transaction was influenced by the events. 
Considering the effectiveness of the data analysis, we only use the data before Prosper was shut down by the government in this 
study. 
 
Data processing 
Usually, mostly transactions in online P2P marketplaces last more than one day, and the data such as the total bid amount, interest 
rate bid by lenders are changing over time. In order to simplify the problem, we take a snapshot of a transaction on the day it is 
built. There are several reasons. Firstly, borrower sets the attributes of the listing such as demand amount, interest rate, loan 
period according to the current situation of market. Second, the attributions of a listing become the most important factors 
influence the lenders’ decisions, such as the bid amount and bid interest rate. Third and most important, more and more listings 
that successfully fund the loan could complete the transaction on the creation date because the increase of the market. 
 
Some data in empirical model could simply get from the dataset provided by the platforms, such as the total demand amount 
(
tDAMT ), total transaction/loan amount ( tTAMT ), total supply/bid amount ( tSAMT ), total number of two-sided users ( tTB , tTL ). 
However, some data such as platform’s profit ( tPprofit ), average interest rate ( tAVIR ), average borrower transaction fee rate 
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( tAVBfrate ) and average lender transaction fee rate ( tAVLfrate ) need to pre-processed through the available data. 
 
On both PPDai and Prosper, the platforms charge transaction fees for the two-sided users when the listing is fund successfully, 
and we choose the successful listings to count the average transaction fee rates. Take Prosper.com for example, the lenders’ 
average transaction fee rate on each date is calculated as follow two steps.  
 
First, we get the lenders’ total transaction fees of loan i  according to the Prosper’s rule.  
 
                                                             1
( / 365)
Months
j j
ti ti ti ti
j
Lfee SLoanAmt Days Lfrate

                                                                   (6) 
 
Then, we add all loans’ total lenders’ transaction fees on date t . And by using the total lender transaction fee to be divided by the 
total loan amount on the same date, we get the average lender transaction fee rate tAVLfrate  of the day.  
 
                                                                  
/ 100t ti ti
i i
AVLfrate Lfee LoanAmt                                                                     (7) 
 
According to the borrower’s price strategies set by Prosper, we calculated the borrowers’ average transaction fee rate as equation 
(8)and (9). 
 
                                    
 IF , ,  ti ti ti ti ti ti tiBfee Bfrate LoanAmt BMfee BMfee Bfrate LoanAmt                                       (8) 
 
                                                                  
/ 100t ti ti
i i
AVBfrate Bfee LoanAmt                                                                     (9) 
 
Form the total transaction fees of two-sided users, could work out the platform’s total income of transaction fees on date t . 
 
                                                                      
t ti ti
i i
Pprofit Bfee Lfee                                                                                 (10) 
 
As shown in the part of online P2P lending’s business model, the interest rate could directly influence on the utility of two-sided 
users, which becomes to be an very important factor influencing on the lenders’ decisions. So, we count not only successful but 
also failed listings into the calculation of average interest rate on each date, which is shown in equation (11) and (12). 
 
                                                
( /12)
(1 (1 12, ))
ti ti ti
ti ti
ti ti
Damt IR Months
Interest Damt
Power IR Months
 
 
  
                                                      (11) 
 
                                                                    
/ 100t ti ti
i i
AVIR Interest Damt                                                                      (12) 
 
Empirical results 
Under the consideration of the interactions between borrowers and lenders, we estimate the empirical models via simultaneous 
equation method. Table 1 and Table 2 present the estimation results based on equation (4), where the dependent variables of the 
two models are   (the success rate of borrower demand) and   (the success rate of lender supply). We use the superscripts   and   to 
separately denote PPDai and Prosper. 
 
PPDai has changed only once for both the borrower transaction fee and lender transaction fee since it was launched. So there is 
only one dummy variable of price in each model. Table 1 shows the 3SLS (Three-Stage Least Squares) estimation results of 
PPDai. 
 
Table 1: 3SLS estimation results of PPDai( N=1,456) 
Borrower Lender 
 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Total number of lenders ( 1
pd ) 1.11 04e  <.001 Total number of borrowers ( 2
pd ) 4.48 05e  <.001 
Total number of borrowers ( 1
pd ) 2.91 05e   <.001 Total number of lenders ( 2
pd ) 8.12 05e   <.001 
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Borrower fee ( 1
pd ) 0.004 0.799 Lender fee ( 2
pd ) -0.078 <.050 
Total demand amount ( 1
pd ) 2.48 08e   <.001 Total demand amount ( 2
pd ) 1.70 07e  <.001 
Time trend ( 1
pd ) 2.10 04e   <0.010 Time trend ( 2
pd ) 5.35 04e  <.001 
2
R
 
0.667 2R  0.424 
2
R
 
0.667 2R  0.422 
 
The estimation result shows that most of the variables’ coefficients are statistically significant under the 1% level, except the two 
dummy variables of prices. The coefficient 1
pd is not significant at 10% level, while 2
pd is significantly negative at 5% level. It 
indicates that the borrower’s success demand rate (
pd
t
SD ) was not significantly influenced by the adjustment of borrower 
transaction fee rate on 16th April 2009, and lender’s success supply rate (
pd
t
SS ) was reduced after the platform’s increase of 
lender transaction fee rate on 5th March 2009 to some extent. 
 
During the period between 16th August 2006 and 12th October 2008, Prosper had adjusted the borrower transaction fee and lender 
transaction fee three times.We use the same 3SLS model to test the effects of these price adjustments, which are implemented by 
adding in three dummy price variables in each equation to represent the four different fee rates. The empirical results are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: 3SLS estimation results of Prosper (N=786) 
Borrower Lender 
 
Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value 
Total number of lenders (
1
ps ) 7.48 06e  <.001 Total number of borrowers ( 2
ps ) 3.27 06e   <.100 
Total number of borrowers( 1
ps ) 2.00 06e   <.001 Total number of lenders ( 2
ps ) 2.34 05e  <.001 
Borrower fee 1 ( 11
ps ) -0.02 <.001 Lender fee 1 ( 21
ps ) -0.07 <.001 
Borrower fee 2 ( 12
ps ) -0.009 <.002 Lender fee 2 ( 22
ps ) -0.003 .764 
Borrower fee 3 ( 13
ps ) 0.001 .868 Lender fee 3 ( 23
ps ) 0.004 .838 
Total demand amount (
1
ps ) 7.15 09e   <.001 Total demand amount ( 2
ps ) 6.84 09e   <.050 
Time trend (
1
ps ) 2.86 04e   <.001 Time trend ( 2
ps ) -0.002 <.001 
2
R
 
0.242 2R  0.229 
2
R
 
0.235 2R  0.222 
 
The 3SLS model produces insignificant estimates of 13
ps , 22
ps and 23
ps . The coefficients 2
ps  and 2
ps  are significant under the 
levels of 10% and 5%, respectively. The rest of the coefficients are all estimated to be significant under 1% level. The results 
indicate that the last adjustment of borrower fee did not obviously affect the borrower success rate. For the lenders, the last two 
adjustments of lender fees did not obviously affect the lender success rate. 
 
Demand-supply relationship 
The estimated results of PPDai show negative effect of total demand amount on the success rate of demand amount 
(
1
2.48 08
pd
e    ), and positive effect of total amount on the success rate of supply amount (
2
1.69 07
pd
e   ). However, the value 
of two coefficients are both negative for Prosper (
1
7.15 09
ps
e    ,
2
6.84 09
ps
e    ). These results suggest that the increase of 
demand amount decreases the success rates of borrower demand on both two platforms, while increases the success rate of 
supply on PPDai and decreases the success rate of supply on Prosper. Comparing the two platforms, the relationships between 
borrower’s demand and lender’s supply are different. Table 3 gives the descriptive statistics of tSD and tSS . 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the success rates of demand and supply on PPDai and Prosper 
 
PPDai (N=1,456) Prosper (N=786) 
pd
tSD  
pd
tSS  
ps
tSD  
ps
tSS  
Mean 0.201 0.774 0.073 0.556 
Median 0.107 0.952 0.071 0.562 
Max 1.000 1.000 0.169 0.841 
Min 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.023 
Std. Dev. 0.239 0.347 0.023 0.102 
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The mean value of 
t
SD  of PPDai is 0.201, and that of Prosper is 0.073. On PPDai, a higher ratio of borrower demand could be 
satisfied than on Prosper. From the supply aspect, the mean value of 
t
SS  of PPDai is 0.774, but Prosper’s value is 0.556. The 
success rate of supply on PPDai is much higher than on Prosper. The success rates of demand on both two platforms are much 
less than the success rates of supply. The amounts of total demand and supply are shown in Fig.4. 
 
 
PPDai (RMB) 
 
Prosper (Dollar) 
Figure 4: Daily total demand, supply and transaction amounts on PPDai.com and Prosper.com 
 
After several fluctuations, borrower demand amount (DAMT) and lender supply amount (SAMT) on PPDai tends to be equal. 
 
However, on Prosper, Borrower’s demand is much higher than lender’s supply.  
 
The estimate results and the demand-supply relationships in two marketplaces indicate that higher demand of money will lead to 
more intensive competition among borrowers, which will in turn reduce the success rate of demand. On Prosper, there are about 
89.6% listings failed to fund the loan, and about 44.9% of them are failed because of insufficient supply amount from lenders. 
When borrower demand amount is quite larger than the lender supply amount, the supply money is diluted and diversified, and 
hence reduce the success rate of supply. Prosper’s success rate of supply could be increased when there is less demand or more 
lenders participate into the transactions. On PPDai, the median value of pd
t
SS  is 0.952, indicating that a high success rate of 
supply. Comparing to the Prosper, the smaller gap between demand amount and supply amount on PPDai, which means the 
higher density of supply amount with a higher success rate. Because of the cooperative relationship between borrower and lender, 
a higher demand will lead to more supply. This could explain the positive effects of borrower demand on the success rate of 
supply.  
 
From the relationships between lender’s supply and borrower’s demand on two platforms, we can conclude that (i) borrowers 
always compete with each other on both platforms because of the less supply amount than demand amount, and the success rate 
of demand is negatively affected by the total demand; (ii) how the demand amount influences the lenders’ success rate of the 
trade is correlated with the demand-supply relationships in the marketplace.  
 
Price sensitivity 
Since PPDai was in operation, its pricing strategy has undergone a very slight change. PPDai charges two kinds of transaction 
fees, service fee and money transfer fee (including the deposit fee and cash withdrawal fee). Table 4 shows the transfer fees on 
PPDai.  
 
Table 4:PPDai’s transaction fees 
Borrower 
Time Service fee rate 
Money transfer fee 
Deposit Cash withdrawal 
2007-06-18 
Duration<=6 months: 2% 
Duration>6 months: 4% 
1% 
<=10,000: 1RMB 
<=30,000: 3RMB 
>30,000: 6RMB 
2009-04-16 
Duration<=6 months: 2% 
Duration>6 months: 4% 
1% 
<=30,000: 3RMB 
>30,000: 6RMB 
Lender 
Time Service fee rate 
Money transfer fee 
Deposit Cash withdrawal 
2007-06-18 0 1% 
<=10,000: 1RMB 
<=30,000: 3RMB 
>30,000: 6RMB 
2009-03-15 0 1% 
<=30,000: 3RMB 
>30,000: 6RMB 
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
1/7/07 1/7/08 1/7/09 1/7/10
DAMT SAMT TAMT
0
1000000
2000000
3000000
4000000
5000000
6000000
7000000
8000000
9000000
1/9/06 1/5/07 1/1/08 1/9/08
DAMT SAMT TAMT
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On PPDai, borrower service fee rate is 2% of the loan amount when the duration of the loan is less than or equal to 6 months, 
which is increased to 4% when the loan duration is more than 6 months. PPDai has not charged the service fee for lender all the 
time, while charged 1% of the loan amount as the deposit fee. Before the date of 15th March 2009, the cash withdrawal fee for all 
users was ¥1 when the transfer amount was less than ¥10,000. Right now, the transfer fee for cash withdrawal is set to be ¥3 for 
the amount less than ¥30,000, and ¥6 for the amount more than ¥30,000. 
 
Compare to the other two types of fees, the cash withdrawal fee that a borrower must pay to PPDai is relatively less, which means 
the increase of the cash withdrawal fee is relatively small to the total fees the borrower pays to the platform. The simultaneous 
regression result shows that coefficient 1
pd  is not statistically significant. It indicates that the success ratio of demand is not 
significantly influenced by the change of borrower’s transaction fee rate. On the other hand, without service fee, a lender pays 
much less fee to the platform than a borrower has to. The change of the cash withdrawal fee is relatively large to the total fees that 
lender pays to the platform. The estimated coefficient of dummy price variable of lender (
2
pd ) is significantly negative. It means 
that the increase of transaction fee will decrease the success supply rate ( pd
t
SS ), indicating the lender’s negative price elasticity on 
PPDai.  
 
The main transaction fee charged by Prosper is the service fee. Different from PPDai’s strategy of pricing, Prosper had revised 
the transaction fee several times for both borrowers and lenders during 5th February 2006 to 12th October 2008, which are shown 
in Table 5.  
 
Table 5:Prosper’s transaction fees 
Borrower 
Time AA A B C D E HR NC BMfee_A-NC BMfee_AA BFRate_Rank 
2006-2-5 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 25 25 1 
2007-2-12 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 25 25 2 
2008-1-4 1% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 25 25 3 
2008-9-24 2% 2% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 75 75 4 
Lender 
Time AA A B C D E HR NC LFRate_Rank 
2006-2-5 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 1 
2007-2-12 0.5% 0.5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 2 
2007-10-30 0.5% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 3 
2008-4-15 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 4 
 
There are eight credit grades (AA, A, B, C, D, E, HR, NC) on Prosper. AA is the highest credit grade, while NC is the lowest. The 
transaction fee rates charged by Prosper are different for borrowers (lenders) with different credit grades. Besides, Prosper sets 
different minimum fees for borrowers with different credit grades in each transaction, displayed as BMfee_A-NC and 
BMfee_AA in Table 5. BFRate_Rank and LFRate_Rank respectively represent the ranks of the borrower and the lender fee rates. 
Fig. 5 shows the Prosper’s daily average transaction fee rates paid by borrowers (AVBfrate) and lenders (AVLfrate). 
 
 
Figure 5: Daily average transaction fee rates of borrower (AVBfrate) and lender (AVLfrate) on Prosper 
 
The fluctuations of average transaction fee rates on Prosper could explain the significant and insignificant coefficients of the 
price dummy variables in the regressions of Prosper. The average transaction fee rate for the borrower was significantly raised 
after Prosper’s first and second price adjustments. The regression results also show that borrower’s demand success rate was 
significantly lower than before after the platform increasing the borrower fee rate at first and second times. On the other hand, the 
average lender transaction fee rate increased a lot after the platform’s first adjustment, while the increase of AVLfrate through last 
two price adjustments is not so significant. This could explain why the coefficients of 22
ps and 23
ps  are statistically insignificant in 
the estimated regression. The three dummy price variables’ coefficients, 11
ps , 12
ps and 21
ps , are all significantly negative, 
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1/9/06 1/5/07 1/1/08 1/9/08
Bfrate_Rank AVBfrate
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
1/9/06 1/5/07 1/1/08 1/9/08
Lfrate_Rank AVLfrate
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indicating that both the success rates of demand and supply are obviously decreased with the increasing transaction fee rates. The 
results also support the user’s negative price elasticity assumption ( 0i  ) in the theoretical part. 
 
Network externalities 
The estimated results of PPDai display that there are significant positive inter-group network effects between borrowers and 
lenders (
1
1.11 04
pd
e   ,
2
4.48 05
pd
e   ), and significant negative intra-group network effects among borrowers 
(
1
2.91 05
pd
e    ) and among lenders ( 2 8.12 05
pd e    ) as well. For Prosper, borrowers have positive inter-group network 
effects from total number of lenders ( 1 7.48 06
ps e   ) and negative intra-group network effects from total number of borrowers 
(
1 2.00 06
ps e   ). On the other hand, it appears the negative inter-network effects from total number of borrowers to lenders 
(
2 3.27 06
ps e    ) and positive intra-group network effect among lenders ( 2 2.34 05
ps e   ), which is different from the estimated 
results of PPDai. The results could be explained by the business model of online P2P lending market, and the demand-supply 
relationships of two platforms (as we mentioned in part 4.3). 
 
In online P2P lending market, borrowers usually compete with each other for the lenders, which is called “inside competition” in 
online selling market[7]. It exists positive inter-group externalities from lenders to borrowers, and borrowers’ negative 
intra-group externalities in both two marketplaces. However, lenders usually do not only compete with each other for borrowers, 
but also coordinate with each other by bidding the listing together. The two-sided relationship among lenders means any network 
effects could be possible, and this is affected by the demand-supply relationship in the marketplace. On PPDai, the gap between 
borrowers’ demand and lenders’ supply is becoming smaller and smaller. Lenders on PPDai have positive inter-group network 
externality and negative intra-group network externality. However, on Prosper, larger demand amount than supply amount lead to 
many listings failed because of insufficient supply amount. The dilution of lenders’ supply indicates that the funding probability 
could be increased to some extent when more lenders participate into transactions, or on the other hand, less demand is requested 
by borrowers. This explains the reason why lender has negative inter-group and positive intra-group network externalities. 
 
Platform’s profit- maximizing pricing strategies 
In the theoretical model, the platform’s profit-maximizing price is given as ( ).
1
i
j j i i i
i
f

   

 

The empirical results show that 
agents in the two marketplaces are sensitive to the platforms’ pricing strategies. The success rates of borrowers’ demand and 
lenders’ supply decrease when the price increases, which is consistent to agent’s negative price elasticity ( , (1,2)i i  ) assumed in 
the theoretical model. Whether platform should charge or subsidize the agent depends on the relationship of agent’s total network 
effects (
j j i i    ) and platform’s variable service cost. Suppose the platform’s service cost of agent iis if  ( 0if  ), platform’s 
profit-maximizing pricing strategy for the agent i mainly depends on the agenti’s inter-group network effect to the other group of 
agents (
j j  ) and the agenti’s intra-group network effect ( i i  ).  
 
By using the mean values of the total number of agents in each group and the empirical results, we could calculated the user s’ 
network effects 
j j i i     of the two platforms. The results are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Network effects of agents and platform’s profit-maximizing pricing strategies 
 
PPDai Prosper 
Borrower Lender Borrower Lender 
Mean value of total user number ( ,TB TL ) 12,998.24 6,015.682 103,527.4 528,47.23 
Inter-group network externality (
j ) 4.48 05e  1.11 04e  3.27 06e   7.48 06e   
Intra-group network externality ( i ) 2.91 05e   8.12 05e   2.00 06e   2.34 05e  
Total network effect (
j j i i    ) -0.109 0.949 -0.380 2.011 
Value of 
j j i i if      Negative  Unknown  Negative Unknown 
Pricing strategy Charge fee 
Subsidy: 0.949if   
Charge fee 
Subsidy: 2.011if   
Charge fee: 0.949if   Charge fee: 2.011if   
 
Both PPDai and Prosper should charge borrower to cover the platforms’ costs, while whether charge or subsidize lender depends 
on whether the platform’s variable cost and the lenders’ total network effects. Lenders on Prosper have much stronger network 
effects than on PPDai because of the positive intra-group network externality and positive inter-group network externality. 
 
As far as we know, one typical characteristic of electronic commerce is its large population of users, which enables significant 
economies of scale [34]. An online platform usually has very low variable costs when it has a large-scale number of users. In the 
electronic market, when the user has strong network effects and the platform has a very low variable costs, the platform should 
provide the service for free or even subsidize the users. For example, in China, Taobao charges no fee from buyers and sellers; 
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Amazon and Dangdang usually have sales promotions; 360buy sells products with low prices to attract buyers. As a new form of 
electronic commerce, online P2P lending market has attracted a large number of users. Taking PPDai and Prosper for instance, 
PPDai has about 40,000 active users on 15th June 2011, while Prosper has about 280,000 active users on 12th October 2008. So, 
the platform should subsidize lenders to maximize the profits when the average variable costs are small enough. Comparing to 
PPDai, Prosper has a larger number of users as well as stronger positive network effects of lenders, which suggests that it is more 
likely setting a lower lender fee for Prosper. However, the truth is that PPDai only charges lenders low money transfer fees and 
Prosper charges a high average lender fee rate. Finally, PPDai’s supply amount tends to be at the same level of the demand 
amount, while Prosper’s demand amount is much higher than the supply amount. Based on these analysis, we conclude that 
Prosper had a higher lender fee rates above the optimal level. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
Using the daily transaction data of PPDai.com and Prosper.com, this study analyzes the characteristics of online P2P lending 
marketplaces. We find that it exits positive inter-group network effects between borrowers and lenders, and negative intra-group 
network effects among borrowers and among lenders on PPDai. On Prosper, borrowers have positive inter-group network effects 
from the lenders and negative intra-group network effects, while lenders have positive intra-group network effects and negative 
inter-group network effects. The unsuccessful rate of listings on Prosper is high because of the less supply than demand, and the 
success rate of supply could be increased when more lenders bid the listings or less demand is required by borrowers. The 
empirical results show that the users’ network externalities are influenced by the demand-supply relationships in the online 
marketplaces, which is different from the conclusions of previous literature of electronic market [i.e., 3, 18, 26]. The literature of 
online marketplace usually discusses the market with the characteristics of two groups of agents – the buyers and the sellers. In 
this kind of market, the participation of one group raises the value of participating for the other group, while the participation 
within the group reduces the value of participating because of the competition. So, in much of the literature, positive inter-group 
network effects and negative intra-group effects are modeled and analyzed [i.e., 3, 7]. However, the business model of online P2P 
lending leads to two-sided relationships (competing and coordinating) among lenders, which means any network effects of 
lenders could be possible. The empirical findings of online P2P lending suggest that as agents in the same group have intensive 
competition, it probably exists negative intra-group network externality. Besides, it will exist positive intra-group network 
externality if the agents in the same group collaborate rather than compete with each other in the transactions. Due to the diverse 
of electronic market, a wider variety of e-business initiatives [9], and any kinds of network effects are also possible, which 
present unique challenges as well as chances in the modeling and analysis.  
 
About how the agents react to the prices in the context of P2P lending, the estimated results show that the success rates of demand 
and supply on both platforms will be reduced when the transact fees for two-sided users set by platform are significantly 
increased, which implies the negative price elasticity. Based on the theoretical model and estimated results, we analyze the 
platforms’ profit-maximizing pricing strategies for borrowers and lenders with several findings. We suggest that both PPDai and 
Prosper subsidize the lenders and recover the loss on the borrowers. The Platforms should charge fees for borrowers all the time, 
but whether charge positive fees for lenders or not depends on the relationship between the lenders’ total network effects and 
platform’s variable cost. Consistent with the empirical results of platforms’ pricing strategies in this study, both PPDai and 
Prosper set much higher transaction fees for borrowers than the fees for lenders, respectively. Comparing the two platforms, 
lenders on Prosper have a much higher positive network effects than on PPDai, and Prosper has much larger users population 
than PPDai. Theoretically, Prosper is more likely to set a lower lender transaction fee. However, Prosper set a much higher lender 
transaction fee than PPDai. This might be the reason why Prosper has a relatively larger demand than supply, while the demand 
and supply on PPDai tends to be equal along the time.  
 
By applying the theory of two-sided market to the online P2P lending marketplaces, the study enhancing our understanding of the 
characteristics of the two-sided electronic marketplaces, which could be shed light on the platforms’ pricing strategies. Moreover, 
the empirical findings also point out theinsufficient works done by previous research, which are the theoretical contributions of 
this paper. However, we think that some further works are still needed in our future research. As a new type of market, online P2P 
lending marketplaces do not have intense competition between them because they usually adopt different business models, which 
is the support of the monopoly model in this study. However, as far as we know, the platforms’ business models are becoming 
more and more similar to each other with the development of the market. For example, with a decade development, the main 
electronic commerce platforms in the same field (C2C, B2C and B2B) usually have quite similar operation modes with each 
other nowadays. Prosper transferred the mode of operation to the LendingClub’s this year. This study does not include the 
competition in the model, which might limit our research outcomes to be applied to future analysis of online P2P lending and 
other electronic markets. Second, due to the limitation of platforms’ cost data, we could not evaluate the platforms’ 
profit-maximizing pricing strategies for lenders and give the profit-maximizing price levels for borrowers and lenders. Third, 
users’ network effects on platform’s price may vary with the development of the platform as Lin et al. [15] assumed that 
increasing network size may have complex effects on the innovation incentives in the platform market. We observe that the 
network externalities is related to the demand-supply relationships in the marketplaces, and how to qualify the relationships is 
also the one direction of our future works. Given to the limitations of this study, we treat our results as illustrative. However, the 
limitations offer opportunities for future work, and this research will try to do further research by solving these problems. 
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